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Market Power in Chinese Taipei: Laws, Policies
and Treatments
KUNG-CHUNG LIU1 and YUN-PENG CHU2
1Jurisprudence Division, Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, Nankang,
Taipei, Taiwan 11529
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Taipei, Taiwan 11529, and Industrial Economics, National Central University
Abstract. The experience of Chinese Taipei shows that opening up a previously protected market
to new entrants can be a more effective and reliable way to enhance competition than regulating the
behavior of dominant or monopolistic firms. Moreover, when opening up the market, the liberalizing
measures adopted by government should be market-structure-neutral. That is, it should not try to
dictate the direction and results of market competition. A more pressure-resistant mechanism should
be designed to deal with market power, taking the form of a regime that is cross-sector, independent
and collective in its decision-making, such as has been the case with Chinese Taipei’s Fair Trade
Commission.
Key words: Cable TV, competition law, market power, merger, telecommunications.
JEL Classifications: K21, L4, L5.
I. Introduction
The treatment of market power is an important issue in the formulation and im-
plementation of competition policies. Different regimes have been designed and
implemented in different economies to deal with the problem. We analyze the ap-
proach taken in Chinese Taipei, first by describing the prevalence of market power,
and then investigating the government mechanisms that have been developed to
deal with it, namely legislation, government agencies, and administrative and ju-
dicial enforcement. We next assess the effectiveness of these mechanisms. The
paper concludes by deriving some lessons from Chinese Taipei for other East Asian
economies about to develop their own competition policies and institutions.
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II. The Formation of Market Power
1. THE PREVALENCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
Starting from a post-war agricultural economy in the 1950s, Chinese Taipei grasped
the development opportunities provided by the cold war of the 1960s and made
itself an export-oriented economy in the 1970s. By means of a relatively stable
authoritarian political system, the ruling political power was successful in legit-
imizing its incumbency through economic prosperity until the 1980s. The uneven
growth rate of economic and political modernization created a bottleneck in the late
1980s, setting off sweeping political reforms that last to the present. Liberalization
and internationalization of the economy went hand in hand with rapid political
change, which has led to much bewilderment among the general public and in
certain areas of government as well (see Chu, 2001).
By and large, before 1990, the economy of Chinese Taipei had two main charac-
teristics: export promotion incentives and protection of the domestic market. This
produced a dual industrial structure. The export sector consisted of highly com-
petitive firms and included many small and medium-sized enterprises, operating in
industries such as food processing, wearing apparel, plastic products, and wooden
products. In contrast, many domestic markets, for example gasoline, electricity,
steel, telecommunications, banking, and insurance were dominated by state-owned
enterprises or by giant private business groups. As one group of scholars put it,
“The former enterprises were highly competitive and market driven, while the
latter were oligopolistic and state directed” (Baldwin et al., 1995, p. 11). Under
this system of authoritarian capitalism, Chinese Taipei had one of the largest state-
owned sectors amongst all the non-communist countries (Chang, 1994, p. 201). In
1988, the revenues of state-owned enterprises still amounted to 15% of GNP.
Inefficiency in the domestic market was one of the main shortcomings of this au-
thoritarian state capitalism (Liu, 1997, p. 74). The domestic market was foreclosed
to a great extent, competition was scarce, and choices were limited. In view of
this, and also because of the growing levels of unfair competition (by both private
and state-owned enterprises) in the marketplace that were damaging the welfare
of many consumers, it was declared in the cabinet meeting of June 26, 1981 that
“The Fair Trade Law and the Basic Law on the Protection of Consumers need
to be enacted as soon as possible so that the protection of consumers will have a
comprehensive legal basis”.1
2. THE MARKET CONCENTRATION RATIO
The concentration ratio of individual markets may provide a useful preliminary
indication of the market power therein. The Fair Trade Commission (FTC) was
1 See Liu (1999, pp. 379–380). However, the Fair Trade Law was not enacted until 1991 (the
Consumer Protection Law was enacted in 1994). It will be explained later in this paper why it took
so long.
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Table I. Market concentration ratio of selected products, 1993–1999
Polyester Cement High-speed Paper for PTA
steel printing (chemical)
CR3 CR5 CR3 CR5 CR3 CR5 CR3 CR5 CR3 CR5
1993 49.98 64.64 52.42 65.97 68.60 75.92 44.07 57.69 77.48 91.85
1995 50.74 67.61 53.50 64.78 74.40 80.53 41.47 54.09 76.10 92.84
1997 47.43 60.52 54.18 67.29 82.16 88.69 42.58 53.89 83.57 97.88
1999 37.30 48.56 55.11 66.04 80.98 86.45 40.65 51.69 86.30 99.65
Note: These markets are the third, and the sixth through the ninth largest markets in Chinese Taipei
in terms of sales. The first, second, fourth and fifth largest markets (respectively, electric power,
automobile gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil) are monopolized by a single state enterprise and hence are
not listed.
Source: Fair Trade Commission of Chinese Taipei.
required by the Fair Trade Law (FTL) to announce a list of enterprises that had a
market share in excess of 20% in their relevant markets.2 It did so for the first time
in 1993. Then over the years, by using its own database and that provided by the
Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), the FTC published the market concentra-
tion ratios of all non-service markets that contained the originally announced list of
companies enjoying a market share in excess of 20%. There were 88 such markets,
called “markets with high concentration ratios”. The publication of these ratios
continued until 1999, when revisions in the Statistics Law forbade such disclosure.
Table I gives the three-firm and five-firm concentration ratios (CR) for the
five product markets that were not monopolized by a single state enterprise and
which recorded the largest sales levels in 1999. The changes in the concentration
ratios of these markets show different patterns. Concentration in the high-speed
steel market increased, most likely because the private firms in that market have
faced difficulties in recent years as a result of the slump in the construction market,
and therefore the giant state enterprise, China Steel Corp., became more dominant
than before. The fall in concentration in the polyester market, where private firms
dominate, was due mainly to increasing competition.
In the services sector (excluding public utilities), the list of monopolistic
enterprises announced in 1993 included railroad passenger services, fixed line
telecommunications, port services, airport ground services, long-haul bus services,
life insurance, trading in commercial papers (bill financing), the stock exchange,
financing of trading in stocks, and TV broadcasting.3
2 The Law was revised in 1999 and this obligation was deleted.
3 The FTC was also required by the original FTL to announce a list of monopolistic enterprises,
defined as those firms that “have dominant power” (separately or jointly) in their relevant markets.
Specifically, the thresholds were CR1 > 0.5 or CR2 > 2/3 or CR3 > 3/4, the firm’s own share is greater
than 1/10, and its sales exceeded NT$1 billion (at the current exchange rate between the NT$ and
the US$ of approximately 35:1, approximately US$30 million). Monopolists whose positions were
granted by the law could be announced as such, even when they did not fulfill the above minimum
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III. The Emergence of Government Mechanisms for Controlling Market
Power
During the 1990s in Chinese Taipei, government mechanisms for controlling mar-
ket power began to emerge, primarily within a general framework of competition
laws. Recently, new mechanisms emerged in the process of regulating the cable
TV market, which has become highly oligopolistic, and in liberalizing the tele-
communications market, which had previously been a state monopoly. These are
not the only sectors that have been liberalized or (re-)regulated, but both are very
important domestic markets, and the regulatory instruments introduced for them
have features that justify a careful discussion in this paper. We also discuss the
FTL itself, which governs competitive behavior in general.
1. GENERAL REGIMES: THE FTL AND THE FTC
It took the Administration nearly five years to submit the FTL draft to the legis-
lature for deliberation and enactment. From the time of its first draft, the FTL was
meant to incorporate antitrust law and the law against unfair competition into one
piece of legislation. However, the inclusion of antitrust provisions drew criticism
from the business sector, and this resulted in a gradual reduction of the original
36 articles down to only eight as the drafting progressed. It took a total of four
years and five months to complete the first reading. The external threat of trade
retaliation from the U.S. played a decisive role in the passage of the FTL, pushing
the legislature to complete the second and third readings in only two months.
At the same time the Organic Statute of the FTC was passed, which followed
partially the examples of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, and also the Korean
and Japanese Fair Trade Commissions. The FTC has nine Commissioners, who
serve a term of three years and may be re-appointed for one more term. All Com-
missioners are recommended by the Premier and appointed by the President. The
number of Commissioners belonging to the same political party shall not be more
than one-half of the total number of Commissioners. In the process of enactment,
the status of the FTC was elevated from a bureau under the (MOEA) to an in-
dependent commission at the ministerial level.4 The FTL and the FTC together
constitute the first government mechanism that systematically deals with competi-
tion, market power, and the interplay between the two. The FTL is jointly enforced
by the FTC, which has the right to investigate and to impose administrative remed-
ies; the Justice Department, which can prosecute offenders suspected of criminal
actions; and the civil court, which settles private disputes related to the FTL.
thresholds. No new announcement of monopolistic enterprises has been made since then and the
1999 revision of the FTL relieved the FTC of such an obligation.
4 Independence means that decisions on whether conduct violates the provisions of the FTL are
made jointly by the Commissioners, and are not imposed from above by the Chairman of the FTC or
the Premier.
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A. Prohibition of Abuse of Monopolistic Market Power
According to the FTL, the formation of a horizontal cartel among competitors that
is likely to affect the market functions of production, trading of products, or provi-
sion of services is illegal per se, unless it is found, following ex-ante investigations
on a case-by-case basis by the FTC (Article 14), to be beneficial to the economy as
a whole and in the public interest.5 The issue of market power is addressed more
specifically in Article 10 of the FTL, which forbids monopolistic enterprises from
abusing their market power by directly or indirectly, via unfair means, preventing
other competitors from competing; improperly setting, maintaining, or changing
the prices of goods or services; or forcing trading partners to give unjustified pref-
erential treatment. However, as of January 2002 only two cases have been found to
be in violation of Article 10.
The FTC had been reluctant to find a violation of Article 10, due to a provision
in it that directly imposes criminal punishment upon the finding of a violation.
However it changed its attitude in 1999 when Article 35 of the FTL was amended,
and the principle of “administrative actions prior to criminal sanctions” was in-
troduced to replace the direct criminal sanction.6 Accordingly, an offender will be
criminally punished, with a maximum imprisonment of not more than three years
or a fine of not more than NT$100 million (approximately US$2.86 million), only
after it has been notified of its violation of Article 10 and it has failed to cease or
rectify the denounced conduct, or resumed that conduct later.
In order to remind monopolistic enterprises not to abuse their market power, the
FTL in its original version stipulated in Par. 2 of Article 10 that monopolistic en-
terprises shall be periodically announced by the FTC. In 1993, as noted above, the
FTC announced 40 monopolistic enterprises across 33 relevant markets, of which
two-thirds were state-owned.7 This announcement was controversial. To some, it
meant only a reminder, whereas others thought it to be the prerequisite for the
application of Article 10. After the announcement was made, even though the FTL
did not regard the mere existence of monopolies to be illegal, many of the mono-
polies included in it filed petitions to the FTC, claiming that the announcement
had damaged their business reputations and asked the FTC to revise it. Moreover,
the administrative procedure required for the announcement used up a very large
amount of the administrative resources of the FTC. All this led to the deletion of
the announcement provision in 1999. Nevertheless, the business community still
felt threatened by the danger of being branded as monopolistic businesses by the
5 There is no guideline on how these terms are to be measured. However, according to the practice
of the FTC, the term ’in the public interest’ has a broader coverage than the term ’beneficial to the
economy as a whole’ so as to include factors other than those of a purely economic nature, such as,
for example, moral and other considerations (see Liu, 1998, p. 26).
6 Administrative actions include the issue of cease and desist orders and of orders to rectify the
wrongdoing, and the imposition of fines ranging from NT$50,000 to NT$50,000,000.
7 See FTC Gazette (1993, pp. 1–5).
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FTC, which further resulted in the addition of Article 5a in early 2002,8 which
explicitly excludes the following businesses from being recognized as monopolistic
enterprises: those with less than 50% of the market share in a relevant market; or
those (two) enterprises whose aggregate market share is less than two thirds; or
those (three) enterprises whose aggregate market share is less than three quarters.9
B. Merger Control in General
The FTL adopts a “prior approval” regime for mergers of a certain size. However,
given the relatively small scale of Chinese Taipei’s firms and markets, merger con-
trol has little role to play. In the first decade of the FTC’s operation, it rejected only
two mergers.10 Pursuant to the 2002 amendment, which extensively followed the
recommendations of Liu (1998, p. 35), Article 11 now reads as follows:
“(1) Any merger that falls within any of the following circumstances shall be
filed with the central competent authority:
1. As a result of the merger the enterprise(s) will have one-third of the market
share;
2. one of the enterprises in the merger has one-fourth of the market share; or
3. sales for the preceding year of one of the enterprises in the merger exceeds the
threshold amount publicly announced by the central competent authority.
(2) The amount referred in No. 3 of the preceding Par. shall be determined by the
central competent authority for financial and non-financial businesses respectively.
(3) After the acceptance by the central competent authority of the complete
filing information, the filing businesses may not proceed with the merger until the
30th day has elapsed. If however the central competent authority deems necessary,
it may shorten or prolong the period aforementioned upon written notification.
(4) The prolonging according to the last Par. may not exceed 30 days; the
prolonged cases shall be decided in accordance with Article 12.
(5) If upon the expiration of the date, the central competent authority does not
issue the written notification of prolonging according to the last sentence of Par. 3
or make the decision according to the last Par., the filing businesses may proceed
with the merger, provided that none of the following circumstances occurs:
1. The period has been again prolonged with the consent of the filing businesses.
2. The information filed by the businesses contains falsehood”.
The threshold amount was originally NT$2 billion and was raised to NT$5
billion in 2000. The FTC resolved on January 31, 2002 to adopt for financial
8 This addition was in effect an “upgrading” of the Enforcement Rules of the FTC (refer to
footnote 3).
9 These thresholds are the same as those cited in footnote 3, but in 1993 they were stated in the
administrative order issued by the FTC, while in the 2002 revision of the FTL, they became part of
the law. The revision serves to appease fears that the FTC could by itself lower the thresholds in the
future.
10 These two mergers both involved cable TV businesses. They were ultimately both permitted by
the FTC upon re-filing.
MARKET POWER IN CHINESE TAIPEI 135
businesses a high threshold of NT$20 billion of revenue in the last accounting
year and a low threshold of NT$1 billion, and for non-financial businesses the
thresholds were set at NT$10 and NT$1 billion respectively. In other words, one of
the merging financial businesses must have more than NT$20 billion in revenue and
the other one over NT$1 billion, and one of the merging non-financial businesses
must have more than NT$10 billion in revenue and the other one over NT$1 billion,
or else they do not have to file a merger application with the FTC.
Article 12 of the FTL provides the FTC with extremely concise criteria for
approving a merger application: it may not prohibit the merger if “the overall
economic benefit of the merger outweighs the disadvantages resulting from com-
petition restraint”. In accordance with Article 13, if an enterprise fails to file a
merger application, or proceeds with a merger despite disapproval of the applic-
ation, the FTC may prohibit the merger, prescribe a period for the enterprises to
split, dispose of all or a part of the shares, transfer any part of the operations,
remove certain persons from positions, or make any other necessary remedies. If
the enterprise further defies the disposition, the FTC may order the dissolution of
the enterprise or the suspension or termination of its operations.
C. Merger Control in Cable TV
A good example of the operation of Chinese Taipei’s merger law may be found in
the cable TV market. Cable TV first appeared in Chinese Taipei around 1976 but
was banned by the government soon thereafter, because the then ruling party and
the state monopolized the TV market. It took the government 17 years to recognize
the tremendous boom potential of the cable TV market and the need for “rules of
the game”. In 1993, the Cable TV Act was passed and the Government Information
Office (GIO) was designated as the central competent authority. In 1999, the Act
was amended and renamed as the Cable TV and Broadcast Act. Its aim was to
curb the market concentration that has rapidly taken place and resulted in serious
boycotts (used as a means of competition between the two major competitors11).
Literally following the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992 in the U.S., the 1999 Act prescribes limits on both horizontal and vertical
mergers in the cable TV market. For horizontal mergers, it is required that any sys-
tem operator together with its related enterprises or other system operators under
its direct or indirect control may not have more than one-third of the subscribers
nationwide; may not own more than half of the system operators within one zone,
provided that there is more than one system operator within the same zone;12 or
may not own more than one-third of the system operators nationwide (Article 21).
For vertical mergers, according to Article 42 of the Act, any system operator
together with its related enterprises may not provide programs on more than one
11 Two large integrated cable TV groups often resorted to boycotts against each other whenever
they could not reach agreement on the terms of broadcasting each other’s programs.
12 The geography of Chinese Taipei is divided into 51 economically viable zones.
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quarter of the channels available. The Act strives to maintain a minimum number
of players in the cable TV market so that competition is possible. Understandable
as this may seem to be from the viewpoints of cultural pluralism or grass roots
democracy, its reasonableness, constitutionality and feasibility, especially in the
light of the digital convergence between cable TV, broadcast and telecom, are
nevertheless all found wanting.
With all the legal instruments at hand, the GIO had reacted powerlessly against
the boycotts that resulted in the extensive interruption of program transmission.
The FTC was forced to deal with the cable TV industry. It took a cautious step by
first issuing guidelines on the activities of cable TV enterprises; it promulgated the
Guidelines on the Review of the Joint Procurement of Programs, and the Guidelines
on the Review of the Joint Sale of Programs. According to the former:
1. System operators that exceed the above-mentioned horizontal merger limits
and undertake to procure programs jointly are deemed by the FTC to be violat-
ing Article 24 of the FTL, which generally prohibits enterprises from engaging
in any deceptive or obviously unfair conduct that is liable to affect the trading
order.
2. Enterprises selling programs to more than one-fourth of the channels available
and demanding system operators within one zone to jointly procure programs
are deemed by the FTC to be violating No. 4 of Article 19, which, when
competition is likely to be lessened or fair competition impeded, prohibits any
enterprise from causing another one to refrain from competing in price, or to
take part in a merger or concerted action by coercion, inducement with interest,
or other improper means.
3. Enterprises selling programs to more than one-fourth of the channels avail-
able and demanding system operators across different zones to jointly procure
programs are deemed by the FTC to be violating Article 24 of the FTL.
Even more radical are the Guidelines on the Review of Vertical Mergers
between Cable TV and Broadcast Program Suppliers and System Operators. These
Guidelines first take account of the fact that the current market structure within
the 51 zones is mainly monopolistic or duopolistic, and then evaluate the advant-
ages and disadvantages of vertical mergers. In order to reduce disadvantages and
fulfill the requirements for the approval of merger applications, Point 4 of the
Guidelines demands that “enterprises taking part in the merger shall externalize
the internal benefits and propose positive measures for the present and future to
prevent competition-constraining results from being produced”. Point 5 of the
Guidelines further determines that in cases of merger by enterprises exceeding
the market share limits, the disadvantages resulting from competition restraint
obviously outweigh the overall economic benefit of mergers.13
13 However, it is not a per se prohibition, because according to Point 6 of the Guidelines, support
for the merger by the relevant competent authorities for industry policy, administrative regula-
tion, communication and culture policy, or for technology development reasons, will be taken into
consideration by the FTC.
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The purpose of merger control lies in preventing the structural deterioration of a
market, rather than being behavior-related. Behavior-related merger control cannot
change market structure, certainly in the short run, and the ex-post monitoring of
market behavior of enterprises is either extremely difficult or costly (Wiedermann,
1999, §21 Rdnr. 59). This is the reason why the German Law against Constraint
of Competition disallows conditions imposed by cartel authorities as a prerequisite
for the approval of mergers, to become a continuous behavior surveillance (Article
40(3)). The European Union holds the same stance, since merger regulations are
presupposed to maintain a competitive market structure. As a consequence, any
conditions attached to a merger must be related to market structure (Cook and
Kerse, 2000, p. 204). However, the requirement by the FTC that positive measures
to prevent competition-constraining results be proposed is obviously behavior-
oriented. Such a requirement is likely to lead to an ongoing watch over cable TV
enterprises and a disproportionate limitation of their freedom to do business. If
such preventive measures meant that system operators must sell or dispose of their
shares in the program providers, then after the sale, would the merger in question
still be a vertical one? If the answer is no, then the Guidelines on the Review of
Vertical Mergers between cable TV and Broadcast Program Suppliers and System
Operators would become inapplicable. It is self-contradictory, if the application
of a rule renders the rule itself inapplicable. Moreover, the FTC would be closing
the door to vertical integration by cable TV businesses, which runs against the
convergence tendency.
Another point of contention is the unparalleled requirement by the FTC that
the internal benefits of mergers should be externalized, which implies that the
merger alone will bring large incremental profits that should be shared with con-
sumers. This assumption errs, however, on two points. First, cable TV enterprises
are subject to tariff controls and therefore a merger will not automatically drive
profits upward. Second, competition in the so-called 4C industries (cable TV, com-
munications, e-commerce and computer network industries) is highly intensive
and dynamic. Profits earned have to be reinvested. The immediate externalization
of profits can amount to nothing more than short-lived price reductions and the
long-term loss of quality and choice of services.
2. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
The Telecommunications Law (TL) is the second law in Chinese Taipei that dir-
ectly deals with the issue of market power. Telecommunications in Chinese Taipei
were operated under a state monopoly by the Directorate General Telecommunica-
tion (DGT) until 1996, when the so-called three telecom laws were pushed through
the Congress with unprecedented objections from the labor union of the DGT.14
The DGT divested the service provision of telecommunications into the newly
14 The Amendment Act to the Telecommunications Law, the Amendment Act to the Organic
Statute of DGT and the Organic Statute of the Chunghwa Telecommunication Company.
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established Chunghwa Telecom Company (CHT), and is now solely responsible
for regulatory matters. The telecom market was then gradually liberalized on a
5-year timetable, including mobile communications and fixed-line telephony. Nev-
ertheless, since the opening up of the telecommunications market, the incumbent
carrier, CHT, has enjoyed formidable market power, commonly known as “residual
monopolistic power”, that needs to be counter-balanced for competition to take
root.
A. A Segmented Market Structure with High Entry Barriers
The telecommunications market is artificially and highly segmented. The TL di-
vides telecom operators into two groups, Type 1 (facility-based) and Type 2
(service-based). Type 1 businesses are further classified into mobile, satellite and
fixed network services. The mobile telecom market is again divided geographically
into regional and national, and business-wise into five classes – digital low-tier
mobile phones (utilizing 1900 MHz frequency), cellular phones, trunking radio,
paging, and mobile data. The fixed network services market is divided into in-
tegrated network, local network, long distance network, international network, and
leased-circuit businesses. The TL foresees high barriers to entry in all these sectors.
Type 1 telecommunications businesses must be franchised by the Ministry of
Transportation and Communication (MOTC), and Type 2 businesses require ex-
ante approval from the DGT, regardless of the areas and the sectors they are in.
While the unauthorized operation of Type 1 businesses is subject to criminal pun-
ishment of up to 3 years imprisonment (Article 57), the unauthorized operation
of Type 2 businesses is punishable with administrative sanctions (a penalty in the
amount of NT$200,000 to NT$1 million and confiscation of the equipment used
for the provision of services15).
High barriers to entry also exist for the integrated fixed network market in
the form of minimum capital of NT$40 billion, an implementation warranty fee
of NT$4 billion payable to the MOTC, and a capacity of no less than 1 million
numbers or communication ports prior to the provision of services (of which up
to only 20% may use wireless local loop). Also, direct foreign equity on local
telecom enterprises may not exceed 20% and direct and indirect foreign equity
may not reach over 60%. The current telecom market structure is concentrated (five
players in the mobile market and four players in the fixed network services market),
the forces of competition are held back by all kinds of regulatory interventions,
and hence the pressure and intensity of competition is only moderate. All this is
ironically done in the name of opening up the telecom market.
15 The US dollar equivalents are $5714 and $28,571 respectively.
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B. Asymmetric Regulation of Dominant Carriers
One of the main themes of the 1999 TL amendment was the introduction of
asymmetric regulation of dominant carriers. This approach was supported by two
arguments. First, that it was more efficient to regulate major suppliers who could
then discipline the minor players. Second, the WTO Group on Basic Telecom-
munications in the Reference Paper annexed to its report on February 15, 1997
stipulated that competitive safeguards against major suppliers should be main-
tained, and Chinese Taipei has promised to adhere to the requirement listed in the
Reference Paper in its WTO accession negotiations.
According to the TL, asymmetric regulation covers the areas of interconnection,
price-cap tariff control, and the abuse of market power by dominant carriers. The
TL does not define the term “dominant carrier”, but does authorize the MOTC
to determine the identity of the dominant carriers. According to Article 5 of the
Administrative Regulation Governing Tariffs of Type 1 Telecommunications En-
terprises, Type I telecom enterprises that have control over essential facilities, or
dominant market power over prices,16 or subscribers or turnovers that account for
at least 25% in the relevant market, are dominant.
A more inconspicuous source of asymmetric regulation is the Tariffs Attribu-
tion Scheme, which was introduced into the Administrative Regulation Governing
Interconnection at the outset of liberalization in 1996. The scheme prescribes that
mobile telecom companies have the right to determine tariffs, not only for mobile
to mobile services, but also for fixed network to mobile communications, and
also to hold proprietary rights over them. Fixed network telecom companies are
obliged to collect tariffs and reimburse the mobile carriers in full, notwithstanding
bad debts, and receive only an interconnection fee for this service. The mobile
operators have every incentive to promote the use of mobile phones by subsidizing
handsets, which makes Chinese Taipei a showplace for the newest handset models.
Many young people especially subscribe to mobile services for the sake of the
handsets alone and not for the service itself. This asymmetric condition has led
to a penetration rate of over 80% in mobile telephony, perhaps the highest in the
world.
C. Some Reflections
Since the second half of the twentieth century, regulation has become common-
place in industrialized societies and has tended to expand. This can be clearly
observed in telecommunications markets around the world. Driven by the motiva-
tion to “create a free and fair environment for competition”, the DGT in Chinese
Taipei is more familiar, however, with technicalities than with market mechanisms
and has over-confidence in the effectiveness of regulation. It has actively made
and promulgated a wide range of rules and restrictions, casting a hard and fast
regulatory net over the industry. Both the regulator and the telecom industry are
16 The term “dominant market power” has not been defined.
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trapped in the mire of regulation, which delays the natural rise and fall of market
power. It would be more desirable to adopt a different approach. Before adding
new regulations, the authority should ask itself the following three questions:
• Is what is needed more regulation or better implementation of existing
regulations?
• Is what is needed more regulation or more protection of rights exercised by
private parties?
• If what is needed is more regulation, are there adequate resources available to
enforce it?
Moreover, asymmetric regulation as a means to enhance competition is noth-
ing but a “Faustian Deal”. It deprives the dominant carrier of the opportunity to
compete fairly, on the one hand, and decreases the intensity, thereby distorting
the results, of market competition, on the other, because it handicaps the powerful
incumbent player by imposing a greater regulatory burden on it, in order to help
the new entrants establish a beachhead. At the beginning, it can of course kick
start competition, but it also lessens the intensity of competition and distorts it in
the long run. As an example, the asymmetric Tariffs Attribution Scheme works in
favor of the new mobile service providers at the expense of the incumbent fixed-
network monopoly (CHT), and yet with the liberalization of the fixed-network
services market, it dissuades new fixed-network service providers from making
investments (see Chou and Liu, 2002). Furthermore, if the asymmetric scale were
to be tilted in the other direction, both the profiting and losing sides would resort
to heavy counterproductive lobbying activities.
IV. Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Mechanisms for Dealing with
Market Power
1. THE FTL AND THE FTC
The FTL itself is a useful instrument for dealing with the abuse of market power,
especially after the 1999 amendment raised the upper limit of administrative fines
by a factor of 50 to NT$50 million (US$1.43 million) and of criminal penalties 100-
fold to NT$100 million (US$2.86 million). It is flawed, however, by not giving the
FTC sufficient power to investigate and to break up monopolistic enterprises that
have abused their market power. Generally speaking, considering its very limited
budget,17 the FTC has done a good job in fighting unfair competition. On the
other hand, however, it has been too preoccupied with unfair competition (to the
end of January 2002 it had found 1763 cases violating the FTL, of which 789
cases involved false or misleading representations and 565 related to deceptive
or obviously unfair competition18) and therefore has been ineffective in curbing
17 The FTC has an average budget of NT$300–400 million per year (around US$8.6–11.4 million).
18 Amongst the most common types of conduct found by the FTC to be deceptive or obvi-
ously unfair are withholding important transaction information, manipulation of public tenders, and
inappropriate warning letters alleging infringement of intellectual property rights.
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market power. It has accordingly been suggested that the FTC should be selective
in choosing which cases to deal with, and not be bound by the complaints filed by
enterprises and by consumers (Liu, 1998, p. 8).
The FTC has been an active advocate within government for deregulation and
regulatory reform. The Ad Hoc Committee of 461 (Par. 1, Article 46)19 and the
Ad Hoc Committee to Deregulate to Further Market Competition led to a compre-
hensive adjustment of economic laws in Chinese Taipei, towards the direction of
achieving a competitive market environment. However, there are undeniable draw-
backs from which the FTC suffers. First, a term of three years for Commissioners
is too short, because a long regulatory tenure can reduce the uncertainty associated
with resetting regulatory parameters and enhance the personal accountability of
regulators. Second, the simultaneous expiration of terms is bad for continuity of
analysis and the accumulation of experience.20
There are cases where the FTL and competition policy intersects with trade
policy and industry policy, most notably with dumping. Dumping can at the same
time violate both the FTL and the Foreign Trade Law. Both laws can be applied to
dumping, because they have totally different legal consequences (Liu et al., 1998,
p. 50). However, the FTC has never used the FTL to handle dumping cases. On the
one hand, no dumping complaints have been filed by private enterprises with the
FTC, and on the other, the FTC sees itself as subservient to the Ministry of Finance
on dumping matters.
2. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
The TL copied many competition rules from the FTL when it was amended in
1999. It does not preempt or exclude the application of the FTL. The disadvantage
of such duplication in the TL is that the FTC will hold itself back due to respect for
MOTC and the DGT, yet these two bodies know little about competition and the
rules for competition. Their handling of cases involving the abuse of market power
can be very time-consuming, indecisive, and ineffective. Moreover, the MOTC
and the DGT can be easily captured by interest groups due to their bureaucratic
structure. The idea that the TL should resemble the FTL probably comes from
the WTO Reference Paper referred to above, but this paper is directed only at
countries without a competition law. Suppose that the TL contains no competition
rules and people can only turn to the FTL and the FTC, and the FTC has the sole
responsibility of regulating competition in telecommunications markets. It is likely
19 Article 46 (1) of the FTL originally provided that “the provisions of this Law shall not apply to
any act performed by an enterprise in accordance with other laws”. This regulation was too broad in
scope and was amended in 1999. It now reads “Where there is any other law governing the conduct
of enterprises in respect of competition, such other law shall govern; provided that it does not conflict
with the legislative purposes of this law”.
20 This is particularly obvious in the area known as the 4C industries, because it takes many years
for the Commissioners to build the expertise and credibility needed.
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that the FTC might be slow at the beginning of such a regime, but it could be more
consistent, pressure-resistant, powerful and effective in the longer term. It is there-
fore advisable to abolish the current dual approach and let the DGT concentrate on
the technical issues.
In order to deal with the convergence that is reshaping the landscape of digital
network industries, the Administrative Yuan has decided to set up the so-called
Telecommunications, Information and Broadcast Commission (TIBC) that integ-
rates the GIO and the DGT and will be independent and operate at ministerial level,
just like the FTC.21 However, following the transition of government due to the
presidential election in 2000, attitudes and policies have become uncertain. It will
only become clear when the Government Reorganization Committee summoned
by the President produces an agenda. It seems that little thought has been given to
the separation of competence and cooperation between the TIBC and the FTC, and
this might cause problems in the future.
V. Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the experience of Chinese Taipei in
dealing with market power. They may serve as lessons for other member economies
of the East Asia region as they strive to develop their competition policies and
institutions:
1. The state is the biggest player in the market and the market is deeply influenced
by the state. Although the activities of most dominant state-owned enterprises
are restrained by their competent authorities to not be abusive, particularly in
the determination of their prices, these state enterprises can still treat their trad-
ing partners unfairly. Cross-government-agency consultation was originally
needed when the FTC tried to remedy such behavior, but this was often fruitless
if the other government agencies (such as MOEA or MOTC) had a strong pos-
ition in the cabinet and were not willing to cooperate with the FTC. However,
as noted in footnote 19, the FTL has prevailed over other competition-related
laws since 1999, and the FTC can now adopt a tough stance if it wishes and
can proceed without concern for other government agencies and the laws that
they administer.
2. Opening up a previously protected market to new entrants has proved to be
a more effective and reliable way to enhance competition than regulating the
behavior of dominant or monopolistic firms.
3. The corrective measures adopted by government to liberalize a previously
monopolized market should be competition-neutral, i.e., it should not try to
dictate the direction and results of market competition. The regulator and con-
sumers as a whole will be better off when market forces are allowed to come
21 This is a reasonable concept because an independent commission with its commissioners from
different professional backgrounds is more competent and pressure-resistant than a traditional single-
interest bureaucracy.
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into play to a greater extent. Whenever market power is accumulating and the
functioning of market is hampered, the best cure is to lower entry barriers,
rather than creating more detailed regulation.
4. Mechanisms designed to deal with market power should take the form of a
regime that is cross-sector, independent and collective in decision-making,
because it is more general in scope, more pressure-resistant and often better
informed. Chinese Taipei’s Fair Trade Commission has been a good example.
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